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CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN CANADA AND THE
COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
by EDWARD MCWHINNEY*
To compare the nature and limits of judicial review of constitutional-
ity in the Commonwealth countries today with judicial review in the
United States, one must understand, first of all, the differences in consti-
tutional history and the differences in basic political theory.
All Commonwealth supreme courts exercising or practising judicial
review of constitutionality today are English-derived or English.influenced.
This holds true even in regard to supreme courts sitting in wholly non-
British countries like India and Pakistan or in culturally-mixed countries
like Canada, where French and English legal elements coexist.1 The
English constitutional heritage means, in formal terms, a much more
dominant r6le for the legislature in relation to the courts than in the
United States.
Dicey, the high-priest of late nineteenth century English constitution.
alism, proclaimed the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament.2 As a
cbnstitutional proposition, it was limited to Great Britain and is certainly
no longer literally true as a description of the constitutional law-in-action
in Great Britain today. Even so, it had major consequences for the con-
stitutional relations between the judiciary and executive-legislative power
and major implications for the nature of the judicial office, including the
judge's opportunities and responsibilities for community policymaking.
Those countries of the old British Commonwealth and the newer, un-
prefixed Commonwealth countries that adopted the system of judicial
review, either expressly or (more normally) casually, almost per incuriam,
have been affected by the historical consequences of the all-pervasive
English doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. The supreme courts,
in contradistinction to their American analogue, :have normally accepted
the view that the judiciary is a relative, dependent institution with neither
a political mandate for, nor the necessary technical competence to indulge
in, ventures in community policy-making. Such policy-making is left to
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the popularly-elected organs of government, the English-derived Parlia-
mentary executive which survives in all of the Commonwealth countries
that are federal systems, including those that have replaced the monarchy
by a presidency as the form of titular executive.
There will be, to be sure, in all of these countries, a certain gap at
times between what the judges say they do and what, according to legal
realist demonstration, they are actually doing in any case; and we may
discover, here, that the opportunities for judicial policy-making are occca-
sionally as considerable in the Commonwealth countries as they have al-
ways been in the United States. But the crucial difference lies in what
Continental European constitutionalists call the principle of legitimacy:
the notion that the exercise of a community policy-making r6le requires,
in a democratic polity, the sanction or authority of popular election or at
least direct political responsibility and accountability for one's actions.
This leads us into the matter of judicial appointments-the nature and
principles of selection of judges for the supreme court. Here we will find
a basic difference, in quality and in degree, between the constitutional
bases and general criteria for appointment to the supreme courts in the
Commonwealth countries and in the United States.
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE
COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES
The institution of judicial review in the Commonwealth countries ar-
rived, as we have suggested, almost per incuriam. The term judicial re-
view, as such, was not in currency in the Commonwealth countries until
the mid-1950's. The public acceptance-the political legitimation, if you
wish-of judicial review was certainly preceded by a wave of American
legal learning in the Commonwealth countries as Commonwealth stu-
dents after World War II chose to take post-graduate legal studies in the
United States rather than in England.3
However, ample historical precursors for judicial review in the old
British colonial Empire and the succeeding British Commonwealth and
unprefixed Commonwealth were contained in the old Imperial institution
of the Privy Council, which sat in London as the final appellate tribunal
for the British Empire overseas. The Privy Council was an instrument
of Empire, in the sense that it existed and saw its own r6le as, first, to en-
sure, if not uniformity, at least mutual compatibility of the private law
3 This is traced in the author's Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Canada, in CANA-
DIAN JURISPRUDENCE: THE CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN CANADA (1958).
4 See E. McWHINNEY, The Privy Council as Final Appellate Tribunal for the Onerseas
Empire, in JUDICIAL REVIEw 49 et seq. (4th ed. 1969); see generally D. SWINFEN, IMPERIAL
CONTROL OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION, 1813-1865: A STUDY OF BRITISH PoLICY TOWARDS
COLONIAL LEGISLATIVE PowERs (1970).
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throughout the colonial Empire, which often permitted, in true pluralist
fashion, the coexistence of many diverse legal systems and traditions; and
second, to ensure full harmony of the public law of the colonial Empire
with the principles and imperatives of the so-called "Mother Country" of
England.
As an instrument of Empire, the Privy Council performed many of
the functions for which the Imperial executive prerogative powers had
been used: to disallow (annul) colonial statutes and laws on the score
of their claimed incompatibility with Imperial (English) constitutional
law. But as a judicial tribunal, the Privy Council acted with far greater
political finesse than would the Imperial executive, the British Govern-
ment, claiming to use its prerogative powers. So, inevitably, in the his.
torical refinement of the instruments and techniques of Imperial policy-
making, the Imperial executive prerogative powers increasingly fell into
disuse and were allowed to disappear, whereas Imperial judicial control
through the Privy Council burgeoned.
The Privy Council, examined in true legal realist fashion through its
actions, certainly indulged freely in judicial policy-making. But it did so
with flexibility, imagination, and most often with magnanimity in rela-
tion to the colonial countries. It acquired a reputation for political de-
tachment and impartiality that historical revisionist judgments since the
break-up of the Empire have tended to augment rather than to diminish.
In Canada, for example, where the appeal from Canadian courts to the
Privy Council was finally abolishied in 1949, the French-Canadian minor-
ity in an increasingly nationalist mood, looks back with some nostalgia on
the era of the Privy Council's review of the Canadian constitution. The
feeling among French-Canadian jurists, indeed, (and there is considerable
evidentiary justification for such a claim) is that the Privy Council was
always far more pluralistic in its philosophy, and far more tolerant of
and sympathetic to French-Canadian claims, than the Canadian Supreme
Court has ever been since the abolition of the appeal from Canada.
II. NATURE AND JURISDICTION OF COMMONWEALTH
SUPREME COURTS
The supreme courts of Canada and of the Commonwealth countries
5E. McWHINNBY, JUDICIAL REvIEw 69 et req. (4th ed. 1969). And see the eloquent
plea by the French-Canadian jurist, (now a Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court), Pigeon,
The Afeaning of Provincial Autonomy, 29 CAN. B. Ray. 1126, 1134 (1951). As an ex.
amp!e of the trend in latter-day researches, even in English-Canada, to take a critical, "re-
visionist" look at older historical ("bad man") stereotypes of the Privy Councils ra1e in Em-
pire and Commonwealth legal development, see the recent thoughtful study by a younger
English-Canadian scientist, Cairns, The Judicial Committee and its Critics, 4 CAN. J. POL, Scl.
301 (1971).
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in general differ from the United States Supreme Court in many important
respects. Since the Judiciary Act of 1925 and the practical control over
its own business which that brought with it, the United States Supreme
Court has-been, to all intents and purposes, a constitutional or at least a
public law tribunal. But that is not so, jurisdictionally, with the Canadian
Supreme Court or other Commonwealth supreme courts.
Inheriting the Imperial pyramidal legal system administered by the
Privy Council, which had full jurisdiction over appeals on all legal mat-
ters of whatever nature within the old Empire, the Commonwealth su-
preme courts are multi-purpose courts with their appellate review com-
pletely unlimited as to subject matter. The Canadian Supreme Court,
for example, has jurisdiction not merely over all matters of constitutional
and public law within Canada, but also over all private law appeals com-
ing from all ten of the Canadian Provinces (member-states). The
Provinces include the nine English-speaking Provinces which all "re-
ceived" the English common law and the French-speaking Province of
Quebec which "received" the French civil law and finally codified it, in
1866, into the Quebec Civil Code which largely. borrows or derives from
the Code Napoleon of 1804.8
There have been proposals from time to time that Canada should
consider adopting the American system and so confine final appellate
jurisdiction over the private law to the Provincial supreme courts. This
recommendation has been put forward most strongly in recent years by
French-Canadian nationalist groups. They have argued, again with some
evidentiary justification, that the Canadian Supreme Court, which by stat-
ute is composed of a majority of English-speaking common lawyers, has
persistently misunderstood, misinterpreted and misapplied the Quebec
civil law and thus has produced a mixed or bastardised civil law that is
heavily infiltrated by alien English common law elements. However that
may be, the multi-purpose, all-embracing jurisdiction of the Canadian
Supreme Court does place heavy demands, in terms of legal expertise, up-
on its members, and at the present time, as very often in modern times,
the Court has no recognized specialist in the French civil law within its
ranks as the present members from Quebec are constitutional or corpora-
tion law specialists.
Within the Commonwealth supreme courts themselves, there are also
certain elements of practice and internal organisation that tend to differ-
entiate, or at least to distance, them from the United States Supreme
Court. The Commonwealth courts, although they have not shown too
6 See generdly E. McWHINNEY, CANADMN JUIsPRUDENcE (1958).
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much temptation to adopt the strict Continental European practice,7 do
at least respect the general elements of Continental European, and in-
herited English, judiial and court practice. They generally observe the
principle of collegiality, at least in the sense of accepting certain limits
on their conduct as judges, inter se. On the whole, judges avoid judicial
personalities and deliberately abstain (more, perhaps, as a matter of ele-
mentary good manners than of conscious political choice) from pejorative
individual judicial opinions, whether dissenting or specially concurring,
which seek to hold up the majority court vote or the majority opinion to
public contempt or ridicule.
Moreover, the Commonwealth supreme court judges, even if they will
never achieve that element of anonymity so prized by Continental Euro-
pean judges, generally maintain a low public profile, keeping away alto-
gether from the desire to run for public office or to comment publicly on
great political events, whether actual and contemporary or past. In a
word, they tend to view their rdle as being far more strictly professional
and so as imposing far more restraints of political prudence than do their
American counterparts. This is a direct consequence, and also a means
of insuring the maintenance, of the principle that the judges themselves
should be legal professionals and that strictly professional legal criteria
should be uppermost in the search for candidates for judicial office. The
Commonwealth supreme courts, up to recent times, have generally been
free of the "men of affairs" who have so largely staffed the United
States Supreme Court since the Roosevelt era. The consequences of that
vital difference in judicial personnel are apparent both in the intellectual
approach and techniques and also in the actual substantive policy choices
and preferences which characterise judicial decision-making in the Com-
monwealth countries and in the United States.
III. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH
Supreme court judges are appointed, in the Commonwealth countries,
by the government of the day as vacancies occur on the court by death or
retirement of existing members. The executive choice is final; there is
absolutely no provision for legislative participation in the appointment
process by way of confirmation or ratification vote nor for the participa-
tion of the governments or legislatures of the member-states or Provinces
in the case of federal systems. What this means, effectively, is that the
central federal government exercises a complete monopoly on the judicial
appointment power and may legally appoint whomever it wants.
7Some of the re!evant comparisons between "Anglo-Saxon" and Continental European
organization and practice of Supreme Courts are ventured in the author's CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN GERMANY AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1962).
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In spite of this legally uncontrolled discretion resting in the central
government, judicial appointments in the past have rarely been contro-
versial politically. If central governments will never appoint known sup-
porters of opposition political parties to the court, and if they also show
a certain penchant for rewarding known supporters of their own party,
the fact remains that the judicial nominees over the years have normally
been technically well qualified, with a recognized background in profes-
sional legal practice rather than a reputation as political ideologues.
The relative freedom of the Commonwealth supreme courts from
the type of political appointments that have very often characterised the
United States Supreme Court from its earliest years onwards is due, I
think, to two factors. First, the mixed (public law and private law),
multi-purpose jurisdiction of the Commonwealth supreme courts demands
such expertise that appointment to a court is generally outside the normal
range of ambitions of the political "man of affairs," who will typically
be rather light in professional legal practice and disinclined to do the
hard work, after appointment, necessary to acquire that expertise. Second,
the general Commonwealth conception of the political r6le of a supreme
court exercising appellate review has tended to be a rather modest or
limited one. Until very recent times, successive central governments have
hardly appreciated the full potentialities for judicially-based policy-mak-
ing as a contribution to general community policy-making on important
social issues.
It -was not until the general reception of American legal ideas in the
Commonwealth in the post-World War II era, with the new wave of
American-trained law professors, that the idea of an activist, legislating,
policy-making supreme court became popular in legal circles. As this
idea penetrated through to government ministers, it inevitably produced
an increasing politicisation of the erstwhile impartial processes of judicial
appointment, which had been relegated to the Attorney-General and the
law officers of the Crown as a largely routine, technical-professional mat-
ter. Just as the World Court's highly controversial one vote-majority de-
cision in the South-West Africa cases8 stimulated, for the first time, an
interest on the part of the Afro-Asian countries in the ideological compo-
sition of the World Court which in turn stimulated active political horse-
trading and exchange of votes for judges, so Prime Ministers in the Com-
monwealth countries began to become personally involved in the process
of judicial appointments.
The new politicisation of the judicial appointing process for Common-
wealth supreme courts can certainly be exaggerated. It will obviously
8 South West Africa Cases, [1966] LC.J. 4.
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vary from country to country, and in all cases the judicial nominees will
tend to have, following the received English legal traditions, high techni.
cal legal qualifications. Yet, only recently the federal Minister of Justice
in Canada found it necessary publicly to defend recent federal govern-
ment appointments to the Canadian Supreme Court by repudiating any
suggestion that the federal government was involved in the "casting aside
of centuries of legal tradition and the transformation of the Court into
a carbon copy of the United States Supreme Court."'
IV. THE FUTURE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH
SUPREME COURTS
There was a time, only a short while ago indeed, when one might
have predicted that Commonwealth supreme courts in general, and the
Canadian Supreme Court in particular, would inevitably follow the route
of the United States Supreme Court to become not merely the "umpire of
the federal system" but the pivot of the constitution, in the sense of being
the prime instrument for accommodating old positive law rules to rapidly
changing societal conditions and community expectations. The patent
political success and popularity of judicial review in the United States,
which came with the inauguration of the Roosevelt majority on the
United States Supreme Court after the Court Revolution of 1937, and the
even more successful transplant of that distinctively American institution
to the new democratic constitutions of West Germany and Japan after
World War II, meant immense prestige for constitutional judicial review
and for judicially-based community policy-making in general.
I think that the cause of judicial review has suffered somewhat, world-
wide, because of the general reaction against American constitutional in-
stitutions and ideas in the post-Watergate era. Such a reaction could be
short-lived, of course, but I believe that the reaction, perhaps unlike that
in the United States, extends beyond the institution of the Presidency to
the other, coordinate institutions of government, Congress and the courts.
The feeling seems to be that all these institutions have become overly
politicised and that the Supreme Court and other federal courts may have
moved too precipitately and also too eagerly into the political fray of
Watergate.
Despite any such immediate reactions, which may always be over-
reactions to passing political events, the fact remains that Commonwealth
countries have begun to find, by trial and error experience if need be, that
the difference in degree between legislating interstitially, as Cardozo im-
plied every court was bound to do, and judicial policy-making in the tra-
9 Lang, Judicial Appointments, 8 L. SOC'Y UPPER CAN. GAZ. 121, 123 (1974).
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dition of the post-Roosevelt United States Supreme Court is a very
substantial one. Judicial policy-making exposes judges to fierce public
criticism by those who do not like the political consequences of their deci-
sions and puts them right in the storm-centre of great partisan contro-
versies for which they have neither the practical political experience nor
the detailed problem-solving techniques necessary to effectuate pragmatic
compromises.
An instance of judicial policy-making is the 1967 Canadian Supreme
Court ruling, rendered by way of advisory opinion, in the dispute be-
tween the federal government and the Provinces (member-states) over
title to the off-shore submarine oil resources. 10 Traditional legal logic in
respect to this issue was hardly compelling either way, and the Court's
final conclusion contains an obvious non sequitur on the face of the rec-
ord. Why should the Provinces of Canada regard the Court's ruling in
favour of the federal government's claims as politically persuasive, espe-
cially since, as at least one Provincial Premier reminded his Provincial
electorate at the time of the Court ruling, it was rendered by a wholly
federally-appointed tribunal?
Why, as another example, should the Province of Quebec regard as
politically conclusive in regard to future Provincial governmental action
to strengthen and extend the French "fact" in Quebec, any future federal
Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of Quebec's recent Official
Language Law making French the official language of Quebec? The
federal government, profiting from the past political errors of federal
overzealousness which attempted to vindicate claimed federal constitu-
tional interests at the expense of Provincial interests (witness the endless
political stalemate resulting from the 1967 off-shore oil ruling), firmly
refused a bid by the Premier of the Province of New Brunswick, acting
at the instigation of English-language extremist pressure groups in Que-
bec, to challenge the Quebec Official Language Law.11 But the way
presumably lies open, in the light of recent Canadian Supreme Court rul-
ings relaxing the constitutional requirement of a legal "interest" on the
part of an individual taxpayer wishing to challenge constitutionality,1-
1o Reference re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights, 65 D.LR. 2d 353 (1968); see
generally Hubbard, Constitutional Law: International Law: Ownership of and Jurisdiction over
Offshore Mineral Rights, 2 OTTAWA L .REv. 212 (1967); and the authors discussion, Les pox-
voirs enterieurs du Quebec, 2 LA RVrUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS (Universiti de Montrial) 277,
279-80 (1968).
11 See generally Fredericton demande que la lois 22 passe le test de la Cour supreme,
I.e Devoir (Montreal), August 10, 1974; Lettre de M. Trudeau j M. Hatfield, id., September
16, 1974; Le bill 22: Richard Hatfield a manqie i la courtoisie f&3trale, id., October 5. 1974.
I-'See, in this regard, Thorson v. Attorney-General of Canada (no. 2), 43 D.L.R. 3d 1
(1974). Compare, as to the Commonwealth, Anderson v. Commonwealth, 47 Can. S. Ct.
50 (1932), with, as to the United States, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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for the same English-language political diehard groups to litigate in their
own right. Should the courts actively encourage such political challenges
to governmental legislation by special interest pressure groups, or should
the courts, instead, exercise judicial self-restraint and insist upon rigorous
compliance with standing requirements as a pre-condition to any constitu-
tional litigation?
The Canadian federal and Provincial governments have answered this
question in part, in recent years, by consciously trying to resolve their
inter-governmental conflicts and differences by diplomatic rather than ju-
dicial methods, by patient negotiation that emphasizes political give-and-
take, mutuality and reciprocity of interest, and compromise, rather than
by political confrontation and a rush to the court-house door. The fed-
eral government's conscious political self-restraint in regard to the Quebec
Official Language Law, especially since that law seemed, superficially, to
be in disharmony with the federal government's own Official Languages
(French and English bilingualism) Law, is a signal of this new emphasis
on diplomatic methods as the solvent for federal-Provincial inter-govern-
mental differences.
The Canadian trend in favour of diplomacy, arbitration, and compro-
mise parallels similar trends in the world community away from judicial
settlement and from recourse to the World Court as a forum for settle-
ment of the really serious political problems. The result, in Canada, is
that the federal-Provincial Prime Ministers' Conferences, both the regular
annual meetings and also special ad hoc meetings for particular problems,
have replaced the Court as the main arena for constitutional problem-
solving in the decade of the 1970's.11 And there is every evidence that
Canadian federalism is working more amicably, and certainly less waste-
fully in terms of use of professional and technical resources, because of
that switch from the judicial to the diplomatic arena for disposition of
the great political causes celbres of our times.
Freed from the impossible burden of trying to preserve inter-govern-
mental peace and harmony, the Court can concentrate more fully on its
traditional, received English judicial r'le: ensuring the harmonious coex-
istence of the private law systems within Canada, applying and extending
the Rule of Law in administrative law matters, and developing a consti-
tutional civil liberties jurisprudence. The Court, in this context, can
amply fulfill Cardozo's mandate to legislate interstitially where necessary,
without succumbing to the temptation to take over the legislative function
from the popularly-elected organs of government which alone can claim
13 Some of the recent developments in this area are canvassed in the author's Federalijm
and the Accommodation of Regionalism, in the special Federalism symposium issue of 9
OTrAWA L REV. (1975), to appear shortly.
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a popular mandate. For its part, the Canadian Supreme Court, which has
generally seemed rather reluctant about assuming American-style political
prerogatives, can go about its more strictly judicial business with the extra
confidence that it will be freed, thereby, from partisan political criticism
and from any consequent partisan political pressures to appoint party
men to its ranks.
